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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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1. Yugoslav leaders interpret recent changes in the policy of Malenkov and the Soviet Presidium as follows:
 - a. Stalin deviated from true Marx-Leninism. The recent changes in Soviet policy vindicate Tito as a true Communist;
 - b. The Soviet working class, which is Communist, threatens to destroy the MVD bureaucratic despotic system, which cannot survive without the strong hand of Stalin unless concessions are made to the workers; and
 - c. The Soviet Union is losing the arms race, forcing Malenkov into a bold stroke in an effort to throw the West into confusion, hoping that the possible result of this will be that the West will abandon the defense effort.
2. The acquittal of the Jewish doctors¹; the removal of S. D. Ignatyev, former Minister of State Security; the granting of amnesty and the Soviet moves in Korea all reflect bold political maneuvering by Malenkov to consolidate control in his hands, with the possible eventual liquidation of L. P. Beriya, Malenkov's principal opponent. Justice or professional competence in the case of Ignatyev were utterly immaterial; all changes have been made strictly for political reasons.
3. The Yugoslavs feel that the West is in great error in regard both to its reaction and to its psychological warfare program. Instead of attacking the

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Satellite governments, the West should make it easier for them to defect from the Cominform camp, now that all Communist leaders of Soviet Satellite nations are confused. Even if all Moscow acts are merely political maneuvering, the only right program for the West is that of demonstrating good will. The West should not miss the slimmest possibility that Malenkov wants the end of the cold war, even if temporarily. The West should appear to meet Malenkov halfway. A demonstration of good will on the part of the West will win for it a psychological warfare asset of greatest value in the Satellites and the Soviet Union.

4. Dragoje Djuric, Yugoslav Minister-Counselor and Charge D'Affaires to Moscow, continues to be frozen out. As yet, Djuric has not been received by Molotov. Provocations against Yugoslavia by neighboring Satellites continue. Yugoslav leaders believe that rather than easing up on their anti-Yugoslav campaigns, the Satellites will intensify these campaigns through fear brought on by their recognition of the true Titoist feelings of their people and the great advantages that current changes give Tito. This belief is based on the following:
 - a. The Satellite policy line will not alter until after Moscow has ordered the change to be made;
 - b. Moscow may become friendly toward Yugoslavia before the Satellites, in view of the fact that Moscow will want to reap the benefits of the change in policy to the exclusion of the Satellites;
 - c. Moscow may even force the Satellites to intensify the anti-Yugoslav campaigns just to increase the benefit Moscow might gain for herself by switching to a policy of friendliness toward Tito.

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